Undercover Ethics
Several readers of yesterday’s post–on the topic of lying to expose some truth–raised the practice of undercover investigations as a counter example to my thesis, asking if I would consider undercover work unethical for the same reason I have qualms about deceptive activists.
Yes and no. I wouldn’t say that the undercover agent shares the deceitful activist’s relativistic allegiance to ideology–their goals are significantly different–but working undercover, to the extent that it means lying and being mendacious, has its immoral aspects.
Lying, as I use the term here, means speaking or acting against the truth in order to lead someone into error. It’s a form of violence because it harms the hearer’s ability to know, undermining the condition of her judgment and decision. It leads to distrust and to the decay of social bonds. Lying is fundamentally wrong on the basis that our lives ought to be lived in accordance with the truth.
This sense of lying comes into play in undercover work. The undercover agent intentionally leads others into error about who she is. This deception affects those deceived: their actions in response to the undercover agent, to the extent that they are based on a lie, are not actions done in accordance with the truth. The deception also affects the deceiver, placing her in a situation in which she acts against the truth of who she is, perhaps even against her conscience, in order to maintain the deception. Stories about undercover agents make for damn good drama precisely because of the morally compromised position they are in.
Admittedly, neither of these affects renders undercover work unjustifiable, but they do mean that there’s a moral cost to every undercover deception. Such deception is never morally desirable, even if, in some circumstances, it may be morally understandable. The justifiability of undercover deceptions hinges on whether lying, as I’ve defined it, is intrinsically immoral.
“…neither of these affects renders undercover work unjustifiable…”
Neither of those effects render undercover work pragmatically unjustifiable, certainly. But I don’t see how they don’t render it morally unjustifiable, if we hold that one can’t do wrong that good might result.
Coincidentally, I just watched the film “The Passenger” last night. The consequences of going undercover are quite well examined therein.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passenger_(1975_film)
But I don’t see how they don’t render it morally unjustifiable, if we hold that one can’t do wrong that good might result.
The question is whether lying always is a wrong, i.e., intrinsically immoral.
Admittedly, neither of these affects renders undercover work unjustifiable, but they do mean that there’s a moral cost to every undercover deception.
That was one of the things that made Wiseguy such an interesting show. Even though Vinny was deceiving mobsters and killers, he was conflicted about it, often enough to want to resign after finishing an investigation. And he had to break cover and tell his Mom he was really a cop, rather than continue to break her heart.
I watched the first story arc a few years ago. It was excellent.
Yes, lying IS intrinsically wrong, for the reason you so precisely state:
“Lying, as I use the term here, means speaking or acting against the truth in order to lead someone into error. It’s a form of violence because it harms the hearer’s ability to know, undermining the condition of her judgment and decision. It leads to distrust and to the decay of social bonds. Lying is fundamentally wrong on the basis that our lives ought to be lived in accordance with the truth.”
I largely agree with what you write here, Kyle. I’ll add that in some ways it seems that just by living and being rational beings, we are condemned to incur the costs. Perhaps, if one is so inclined to believe it, this is a peculiar feature of living in a fallen world as fallen creatures.
I would like to see a clarification on the meaning you assign to “error” in “Lying, as I use the term here, means speaking or acting against the truth in order to lead someone into error. ” When I read this sentence, I thought you meant “error” in the sense of “state of doing wrong” or “state of mistaken morality,” and yet later, you seem to mean what people usually mean by “error”: an incorrect assessment of what’s going on. My question is, do you see any validity in drawing a distinction here? Is a lie particularly more morally blameworthy if it leads to a moral error than if it leads “merely” to a factual error?
I’m not entirely sure what the stakes are for the question I just asked. It’s more just an idle thought on my part.
Pierre —
If you’ll forgive me for jumping in to answer your question posed to Lyle, I would venture the opinion that the difference between a lie leading to a moral error and a lie leading to a factually incorrect assessment, is a matter of degree. Both are hurtful, and therefore wrong.