Featured Post

Dignitas Versus Auctoritas


Photograph by Kurt Löwenstein Educational Center International Team (used under creative commons license).


If I believed in a God, I would call Her damnation down upon my day job.

You see, the day job gets in the way of blogging. If I hadn’t had three summary judgment motions to oppose within two weeks mixed in between three all-day mediations during the same period of time, I would have been able to divert my time around differently. I’d have read and dug into the transcripts of the oral arguments in the same-sex marriage cases argued before the Supreme Court on Tuesday earlier. And I’d have teased out — I’m certain that I would have — that the fulcrum of the case is an emergent intellectual facet of the law is an old concept finding itself elevated into the law, called “dignity,” following a path staked out a century ago in eerily familiar fashion for another concept called “privacy.”

Unfortunately, I do have a day job, and the result of having to pay attention to actual clients who actually pay my bills instead of getting to devote my whole intellectual attention to the writing I do for pleasure is that I got scooped by Jeffrey Rosen at the Atlantic, who yesterday published his own insightful, smart, and dead-on-the-bullseye identification of “dignity” as the core of the arguments. Mr. Rosen even goes so far as to point out that describing dignity as a dimension of liberty may well wind up having a dark side that might later be regretted by liberals, progressives, and others who would applaud a finding in June of a Constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Thus, he occupied the territory of ambiguity and concern about intellectual origins that I usually stake out for myself.

Not that I can blame Mr. Rosen for doing so. His analysis is exactly right even if some of the nuances and forebodings he makes are not precisely what I’d say. Better, his exposition and explanation are more concise and digestible by the intelligent layperson than what I’d likely have come up with blazing the trail on my own. Seriously, go read it: here’s that link again. I doubt you’ll find a better, more easily readable analysis of this idea, offering the same level of legal insight, anywhere else.

Since Mr. Rosen has occupied this portion of the intellectual field, I’m going to have to approach the arguments from a different slant. So, let’s return to what happened in the Obergefell arguments will return to the fore, bearing in mind that we inevitably must return to this concept.



Over the course of the last twenty or so years in which this issue has been in the realm of public debate, the pro-SSM and anti-SSM arguments have become fairly standardized. Bear with me while I run through them quickly here. Let’s start with the pro-SSM arguments, all of which I fundamentally agree with, although no preference should be inferred from the order in which I have set forth the list:

1. The Argument from Equality: People should be treated equally by the government unless there is a very good reason for the government to treat them differently. People who want opposite-sex marriages can have them. There’s no good reason not to treat people who want same-sex marriages the same way.

2. The Argument from Dignity: Prohibitions on same-sex marriages single out LGBTQ people for obloquy and inferior treatment, which is not justified in this case. Affording LGBTQ people dignity equal to that afforded to heterosexuals is imperative to what this country is all about.

3. The Argument from Fundamental Rights: Basic civil liberties like voting and free speech are not subject to democratic or legal restriction (except under very dire and extreme situations). Marriage is such a civil liberty, so must not be restricted (any more than is absolutely necessary).

4. The Argument from Harmlessness: Same-sex marriage is a private decision between consenting adults, which causes no harm to anyone else and which implicates no substantial legitimate governmental interest. Therefore, it should be permitted.

5. The Argument from Domestic Bliss: If denied the ability to marry, LGBTQ people will structure their own lives and communities largely without the pair-bonding and life-planning available to heterosexuals, diminishing the quality of their lives for no good reason.

6. The Argument from Legal Uniformity: If one State has SSM and another does not, we have the legally untenable situation of people being married in one State but simultaneously not married in another, which creates the potential for all sorts of havoc. Therefore, SSM should be for everyone, everywhere.

So far, the Argument From Equality and the Argument from Dignity appear to be the ones winning the day, at least in the courts and, in my opinion, out in the body politic. On the briefs, the plaintiffs relied heavily on both of these. The Government relied almost exclusively on the Argument from Equality.

Arrayed against this, I’ve teased out six different anti-SSM arguments that have all been made with sobriety at one point or another through the entirety of my professional life, which I’m just now realizing has been only a little bit longer than the lifespan of same-sex marriage as a political issue:

1. The Argument by Definition (also known as The Argument from History): Marriage is between a man and a woman, has always been so. That’s just what marriage is and it’s silly to insist on putting the same label on something different.

2. The Argument from Procreation: Marriage exists to encourage the creation of families. Same-sex couples can’t make babies. So marriage, or not marriage, isn’t as important for them.

3. The Argument from Democracy: Whether same-sex marriage should be permitted, or not, is something we should leave up to the democratic process. If that process results in a ban on SSM, oh well, you can always try again next election. An important corollary to this is that democracy occurs on the state level.

4. The Argument from Prudence: We alter fundamental social institutions such as marriage at very grave peril, and we cannot be certain of whether introducing SSM into our culture will hurt people in ways we cannot now predict. We should be cautious and not do this until and unless we’re really sure it will create a net benefit to everyone.

5. The Argument of the Slippery Slope: If we permit same-sex marriages, there will be no intellectually honest way to avoid granting polygamous or incestuous marriages as well, which are undesirable for all sorts of reasons, even if the proposed marriages are amongst adults who truly consent.

6. The Argument from Conscience: A person might wish to condemn SSM as morally wrong, as when they feel compelled to do so by way of religious creed. Writing SSM into the law compels such people to afford dignity and recognition to something they personally believe to be morally wrong, legally overriding their own consciences.

I think that’s pretty much it. Of these, I personally have pretty much always found the Argument from Conscience and the Argument from Prudence to be the ones most worthy of intellectual cachet when invoked by an anti-SSM interlocutor. YMMV. The states relied heavily on the Argument from Democracy and the Argument from Procreation in their briefs. In Tuesday’s oral argument, we got a veritable smörgåsbord of these.

Predicting how these will play out in front of the Nine is the next challenge.



The conventional wisdom is that no one is really going to be able to persuade Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito to do anything but vote against a finding of same-sex marriage as an individual right protected by any portion of the Constitution; on the other hand, no one is going to be able to persuade Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan to do anything other than vote in favor of such a ruling. Now, it’s true that both Roberts and Breyer did a little bit of flirting with the side they aren’t anticipated to vote with. That’s nothing to get excited about, believe me.

Which means, it’ll all come down to Justice Anthony Kennedy.


Anthony M. Kennedy, 93rd Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. U.S. Government photograph.

Justice Kennedy is directly on the spot, inescapably torn between his basic conservatism of upholding the state as a bulwark of society, and his push to make the judiciary an instrument of needed social justice; Kennedy the Federalist must wrestle with Kennedy the Civil Libertarian. In his recent opinion in U.S. v. Windsor, deference to traditional state powers dovetailed with extending civil liberties, resulting in an invalidation of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act. It was, at least in retrospect, an easy call to see Justice Kennedy making after looking back over a career of impressively strong refereeing between Federal and State powers, and a career of equally strong and impressively-written opinions affirming that LGBTQ Americans are entitled to equal treatment by their government, whether their governments act through judicial decision, legislation, or even direct democracy. SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston, who was present for the argument and is an experienced observer of individual Justices’ mannerisms during argument, describes Justice Kennedy as visibly uncomfortable and wrestling with both sides of the issue.

And the tea leaves Justice Kennedy scattered in the wake of his questions leave everyone who has looked at the argument itself unable to confidently predict how he will ultimately vote. And the oral arguments are the last chance anyone has to glean what he might be thinking, and to offer an argument to sway him one way or the other. A great deal comes down to the skill with which the three attorneys who argued before the Court on Tuesday listened to and answered his questions.

Obergefell was a particularly raucous session of oral argument before the High Court, as these things go, the sort of thing that makes the more precious among the self-appointed protectors of the decorum of the Court repeatedly clutch at their pearls. A protestor in the gallery jumped up and shouted at the end of Ms. Bonauto’s argument that Justice Kennedy would be sent to Hell if he voted in favor of same-sex marriage, he was hustled out of the courtroom by security.[1] Justices interrupted one another, counsel spoke over the Justices without any apparent sanction by the Chief, and of all people Sonia Sotomayor — hardly a shrinking violet in terms of the force of her personality — had to struggle three times to get a word in edgewise amongst her colleagues and the attorneys.

In such an environment, under-prepared, under-skilled lawyers would get roasted and eaten alive. Fortunately, we’re not talking about just any lawyers.



Mary Bonauto

Photograph portrait of Mary L. Bonauto courtesy of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

For the plaintiffs — most prominently members of same-sex couples seeking the right to marry, challenging various state bans against same-sex marriage — is Mary Bonauto, who is a MacArthur Foundation fellow (!), a lecturer at Harvard Law School, and Civil Rights Project Director at the Boston-based Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) since 1990. (Interestingly, Ms. Bonauto’s wife is a professor of law at the University of Maine with a very substantial academic pedigree to match.) Ms. Bonauto’s most significant claim to fame before yesterday was that she was lead counsel in the groundbreaking Goodridge v. Department of Public Health case which resulted in Massachusetts being the first state to grant full marriage rights to same-sex couples, way back in 2004.

So we SSM advocates would seem to have plenty of reason to be confident that the attorney representing our favored side has all the very best qualifications and experience to argue this very issue. So if we assume that the questions Justice Kennedy asks, and the answers he gets to them, are the best insight we can have into what the Court’s ruling will be, there is cause to quickly draw in a sharp breath of air.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: One ­­– one of the problems is when you think about these cases you think about words or cases, and ­­ and the word that keeps coming back to me in this case is ­­ is millennia, plus time. First of all, there has not been really time, so the Respondents say, for the Federal system to engage in this debate, the separate States. But on a larger scale, it’s been ­­ it was about ­­ about the same time between Brown and Loving as between Lawrence and this case. It’s about 10 years. And so there’s time for the scholars and the commentators and ­­ and the bar and the public to engage in it. But still, 10 years is ­­ I don’t even know how to count the decimals when we talk about millennia. This definition has been with us for millennia. And it ­­ it’s very difficult for the Court to say, oh, well, we ­­ we know better.

MS. BONAUTO: Well, I don’t think this is a question of the Court knowing better. When we think about the debate, the place of gay people in our civic society is something that has been contested for more than a century. And in this ­­ in the last century, immigration exclusions, the place of gay people in public employment and Federal service, these are all things that have been contested and ­­ and you can ­­you can say 10 years of marriage for Massachusetts, but it’s also in the 1970s that the Baker case from Minnesota reached this Court, and that’s over 40 years ago. And it was over 20 years ago that the Hawaii Supreme Court seemed to indicate that it would rule in favor of marriage, and the American people have been debating and discussing this. It has been exhaustively aired, and the bottom line is that gay and lesbian families live in communities as neighbors throughout this whole country. 6:18-8:3 [2]

Kennedy’s first question in the case is a restatement of the Argument by Definition. That’s a tough one to argue against when it’s presented front and center, because it carries a pretty strong assumption that the maker of that argument has already decided that marriage can only be between one man and one woman.

For Court-watchers, this is a remarkably long question, and a remarkably long answer. But it doesn’t stop there. All of Kennedy’s questions must feel like ice-cold daggers directly to the hearts of SSM advocates:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But it’s ­­– you ­­– you said that, well, marriage is different because it’s controlled by the government. But from a historical, ­­from anthropological standpoint, Justice Scalia was very careful to talk about societies. Justice Alito talked about cultures. If you read the ­­ about the Kalahari people or ­­ or ancient peoples, they didn’t have a government like this. They made it themselves and it was man and a woman.

MS. BONAUTO: There were certainly prior to ­­ there were marriages prior to the United States forming and we recognize that. But when our nation did form into this union in 1787 and then when it affirmed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, that’s when we made our nation collectively made a commitment to individual liberty and equality. 15:12-16:2

Twice, Justice Kennedy challenges Ms. Bonauto with the Argument by Definition. That’s not to say these weren’t the only arguments that Ms. Bonauto had to confront. He went on to confront Ms. Bonauto with the Argument from Prudence, to which she responds with the Argument from Harmlessness:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, part of wait and see, I suppose, is to ascertain whether the social science, the new studies are accurate. But that ­­ it seems to me, then, that we should not consult at all the social science on this, because it’s too new. You think you say we don’t need to wait for changes. So it seems to me that if we’re not going to wait, then it’s only fair for us to say, well, we’re not going to consult social science.

MS. BONAUTO: Well, two points on that, if I may. In terms of waiting, I do think the effect of waiting is not neutral, it does consign same­-sex couples to this outlier status, and there will be profound consequences that follow from that. But then setting that aside vis­-à­-vis the social science, there have been trials, of course in the Michigan case, in Arkansas, in Florida about adoption bans. These issues have been aired repeatedly, and there is, as you all have heard, a social science consensus that there’s nothing about the sex or sexual orientation of the parent that is going to affect child outcomes. And this isn’t just research about gay people. It’s research about, you know, again, what is the effect of gender, it goes for 50 years. 20:16-21:14

The fact that Kennedy followed up two Argument by Definition questions with an Argument from Prudence must surely have been a bit dispiriting to Ms. Bonauto when she eventually had a moment to reflect on it. That moment was almost assuredly not during the argument itself. She too many questions from too many other sources, including the Slippery Slope from Justice Alito and the Argument from Conscience from Justice Scalia and rather a lot more of the Argument by Definition from Chief Justice Roberts. So her mind would have been quite full while she was standing, and only after her time was up, and Solicitor General Verrilli, dressed in resplendent morning dress, got the floor, could it have settled in her mind that Kennedy was asking about the most self-answering question he could have been that she could not possibly directly rebut — and note that she didn’t respond by directly saying “Marriage, at least as a matter of law, can mean whatever we decide it means. This is what the Constitution requires of us when making that decision: treating people equally.”

Ah well, the best argument you make is always the one that occurs to you driving back to the office. Which doesn’t mean you won’t win — if the case is under submission, you’ve got a chance.



That Government’s case was argued personally by the Solicitor General of the United States of America is an indicator of the paramount political importance of the matter.

Donald Verrilli, Solicitor General of the United States. Who didn't challenge the plaintiff's standing to sue.

Donald Verrilli, 46th Solicitor General of the United States. U.S. Government photograph.

Particularly important in the light of the idea that we’re looking at “dignity-as-liberty” emerging into the law, General Verrilli urges the Court to adopt same-sex marriage as a Constitutional right on narrower grounds than does Ms. Bonauto for the plaintiffs: the Government has adopted the position that the Equal Protection Clause, alone, compels this result.

The Government’s argument began with a remarkable amount of deference from the bench. General Verrilli got to make all three points of his argument before having to field an actual question. Those three points were a refutation of the Argument from Democracy with the Argument from Fundamental Rights, a refutation of the Argument from Prudence with the Argument from Legal Uniformity put in the context of racial desegregation, and a cocktail of the Argument from Fundamental Rights and the Argument from Dignity. And it was on this last point which prompted the all-but-certain swing voting member of the panel to jump in:

GENERAL VERRILLI: And third, I want to expand on what Ms. Bonauto said, that ­­ that ­­ and I think you, Mr. Chief Justice, you did recognize this, that the decision to leave this to the political process is going to impose enormous costs that this Court thought were costs of constitutional stature in Windsor. Thousands and thousands of people are going to live out their lives and go to their deaths without their States ever recognizing the equal dignity of their relationships.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, you could have said the same thing 10 years ago or so when we had Lawrence. Haven’t we learned a tremendous amount since ­­ well, since Lawrence, just in the last 10 years?

GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. And, Your Honor, I actually think that’s quite a critical point that goes to the questions that Your Honor was asking earlier. I do think Lawrence was an important catalyst that has brought us to where we are today. And I think what Lawrence did was provide an assurance that gay and lesbian couples could live openly in society as free people and start families and raise families and participate fully in their communities without fear. And there are ­­ two things flow from that, I think. One is that has brought us to the point where we understand now, in a way even that we did not fully understand in Lawrence, that gay and lesbian people and gay and lesbian couples are full and equal members of the community. And what we once thought of as necessary and proper reasons for ostracizing and marginalizing gay people, we now understand do not justify that kind of impression. 30:1-31:7

Well, now. Here we have something that seems a bit different from Justice Kennedy: he appears to be inviting a refutation of the Argument from Prudence, but he wants to hear that argument refuted with something different than the Government’s first attempt, which was to deploy the Argument from Legal Uniformity. So General Verrilli instead tries the Argument from Dignity which was the central intellectual theme in Lawrence — and works in no small amount of flattery for the author of the opinion in Lawrence who happens to be, mirabile dictu, the very same Justice who just asked him the question. Credit where it’s due, General Verrilli: I’ve criticized you in the past, but this was smooth. Will General Verrilli handle the next question from Justice Kennedy with similar aplomb?

JUSTICE ALITO: Let me ask you ­­–

JUSTICE KENNEDY: I have one question. I see your time is going out. I’m interested in your comments on Glucksberg, which says what we should have to define a fundamental right in its narrowest terms. A lot of the questions that we’re ­­– we’re asking your colleague in the earlier part of the argument were ­­– had ­­– had that in mind, I think. What ­­– what do we do with the language of Glucksberg that says we have to define it in a narrow way?

GENERAL VERRILLI: Justice Kennedy, forgive me for answering the question this way. We do recognize that there’s a profound connection between liberty and equality, but the United States has advanced only an equal protection argument. We haven’t made the fundamental rights argument under Glucksberg. And therefore, I’m not sure it would be appropriate for me not having briefed it to comment on that.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, can you tell me why you didn’t make the fundamental argument?

GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, because we think ­­well, because we think while we do see that there is, of course, this profound connection, we do think that for reasons like the ones implicit in the Chief Justice’s question,[3] that this issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is equal participation in a State conferred status and institution. And that’s why we think of it in equal protection terms.

And if I could just — in the ­­ in the little time that I have left, I’d like to suggest this, that what the Respondents are ultimately saying to the Court is that with respect to marriage, they are not ready yet. “And yes, gay and lesbian couples can live openly in society, and yes, they can raise children. Yes, they can participate fully as members of their community. Marriage, though, not yet. Leave that to be worked out later.” But the Petitioners –­­ the Petitioners, these gay and lesbian couples are ­­–

JUSTICE SCALIA: Or not. Or not. I mean, that’s not what they are saying. They are saying leave it to the people. It will be worked out later or not.

GENERAL VERRILLI: But what these gay and lesbian couples are doing is laying claim to the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment now. And it is emphatically the duty of this Court, in this case, as it was in Lawrence, to decide what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 38:16-40:14.

I’m not prepared to call that a home run answer so much as a ground-rule double; a solid hit with the return invocation to Lawrence and an echo of Marbury v. Mardison to add a gloss of legitimacy to the ruling that Justice Kennedy is still apparently hesitant to make. But he didn’t really get at what Kennedy was really asking: “Okay, let’s say I decide that the best argument is the Argument from Dignity. Tell me how to write my opinion in the way that defeats the Argument from Democracy by the narrowest possible margin.” Verrilli doesn’t quite do that here. But it is a tea leaf more promising for SSM advocates and less promising for SSM opponents (or Federalism advocates, if you prefer).

Now, you may have already decided that I’m a horrible person for reducing the debate about one of the most critical and prominent civil liberties issues of our lifetimes into a series of six essentially standardized arguments and the Supreme Court’s argument as though the arguments were being deployed against one another like so many Pokémon cards. If so, bear in mind that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy and General Verrilli all tacitly do the same thing here, attaching labels to the arguments to talk about them.

So after saying that gay people shouldn’t have to wait for democracy to catch up with their fundamental rights, General Verrilli’s time expires, and the focus shifts to Mr. Bursch on behalf of the respondent States.



John J. Bursch, 10th Solicitor General of the State of Michigan

John J. Bursch, 10th Solicitor General of Michigan. Self-portrait (used under creative commons license).

On behalf of the states, and thus urging that same-sex marriage bans may be adopted by individual states consistent with the Constitution, is John J. Bursch, currently in private practice in a prestigious firm based in Grand Rapids, Michigan. He previously served as Solicitor General for the state of Michigan and is acting in this case by appointment as a Special Deputy Solicitor General for the state. Mr. Bursch’s C.V. is deeply impressive. Notably, Mr. Bursch is apparently not sponsored by nor arguing on behalf of a political or religious-rights advocacy group. His client is the State of Michigan and it is not apparent that he has either personal opposition to nor personal support of same-sex marriage, other than that he believes it ought to be adopted, if at all, through democratic means rather than imposed by a court.

This readily shows through in his argument, which is very thoroughly based in the concepts of the Constitutional imperatives of states exercising plenary power over marriage in the two-tier Constitutional scheme, and the foundation of democracy upon which the Constitution is based. His arguments have clearly been calculated to appeal directly to the best fulcrum of the case available to uphold the state’s SSM ban: Justice Kennedy’s scheme of balancing State and Federal powers and respect for the ability of people in a democracy to self-govern. His preferred positioning would have been that he was there to argue in favor of the right of an individual to vote for a policy that she prefers. Which is why he was probably uncomfortable under questioning by the swing vote on the Court:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that [drawing a distinction between a couple who marry for a potentially impermanent emotional bond and a couple who marry for the purpose of jointly raising children]­­ assumes that same­-sex couples could not have the more noble purpose, and that’s the whole point. Same­-sex couples say, of course, we understand the nobility and the sacredness of the marriage. We know we can’t procreate, but we want the other attributes of it in order to show that we, too, have a dignity that can be fulfilled.

MR. BURSCH: And Justice ­­–

JUSTICE KENNEDY: And ­­– and ­­– but you argued in your brief, and Justice Kagan was quite correct to ­­ to say that you’re saying that this harms conventional marriage. That was the argument you made in your brief as I understood it.

MR. BURSCH: Justice Kennedy, to be perfectly clear, the State of Michigan values the dignity and worth of every human being, no matter their orientation or how they choose to live their life. That’s not what this case is about. Our point is that when you change something as fundamental as the marriage definition, as Chief Justice Roberts was saying, the dictionary definition which has existed for millennia, and you apply that over generations, that those changes matter. [¶]

JUSTICE KENNEDY: [H]ow do we get from what I just said ­­… ­­ to some kind of rational or ­­ or important distinction?

MR. BURSCH: What ­­ we’re concerned about all the children, children of opposite­-sex couples and children of same­-sex couples. There are 73 million children in this country. If this Court ensconces in the Constitution a new definition of marriage and it reduces the rate that opposite­-sex couples stay together, bound to their children, because of that different understanding, even a 1 percent change … is many, many children. 49:2-24; 50:11-51:2 (crosstalk elided).

The first time I read through this, I was incredulous. “Did he really just make a ‘Won’t somebody please think of the children’ argument”?

Upon reflection, though, I changed my mind. This may actually a pretty good piece of turf for him to fight on, at least on defense — health, welfare, and safety are generally considered compelling governmental interests, especially so when children are considered. So even if he loses the battle for saying marriage is a fundamental right and therefore restrictions on it must survive strict scrutiny, he’s still got room to say that the SSM ban is narrowly-tailored, under the Argument from Prudence.

Later on, Justice Kagan asked Mr. Bursch a question after he proffered the argument that the State’s interest is not fostering emotional bonds between adults but rather encouraging bonds to form between parents and children:

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Bursch, suppose ­­suppose this: Suppose that there’s a State with a very procreation­-centered view of marriage of the kind that you’re talking about. And it ­­– you know, so emotional commitment and support, all of these, the State thinks are not the purpose of marriage and they want their marriage licenses to be addressed only to the things which serve this procreation purpose. And so they say, “Well, we’re not giving marriage licenses to any ­­– to anybody who doesn’t want children.” So when people come in and ask for a marriage license, they just ask a simple question: “Do you want children?” And if the answer is no, the State says, “No marriage license for you.” Would that be constitutional? 53:10-23.

Mr. Bursch’s response didn’t satisfy Justice Kagan, and there was quickly enough crosstalk that the Chief Justice had to step in and award the floor to one of this colleagues. Justice Kennedy used this privilege to demand a direct answer to Justice Kagan’s question. That answer turned out to be, “I think it would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy to ask the question.” 54:22-24.

I’m generally thinking that was a misstep, as it reveals that the Argument from Procreation is not really founded on anything. If marriage is about procreation, but actually doing something to directly relate marriage and procreation is an unconstitutional infringement on privacy rights, then marriage can’t really be about procreation.

Mr. Bursch doesn’t do very well with his next at-bat before Justice Kennedy, either, on the issue of marriage encouraging bonding between parent and child:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: And ­­– and under your view, it would be very difficult for same­-sex couples to adopt some of these children. I ­­– I think the argument cuts quite against you.

MR. BURSCH: Well, what ­­– what I’m talking ­­–

JUSTICE KENNEDY: And ­­ and it goes back to the basic point where you began where you had some premise that only opposite­-sex couples can have a bonding with the child. That’s ­­– that was very interesting, but it’s just a wrong premise.

MR. BURSCH: No. That’s not my premise. The premise is that we want to encourage children to be bonded to their biological mother and father. We don’t deny at all ­­ disagree at all that same­ sex couples can be bonded to their children. We hope that’s the case. 65:10-25

When the critical swing vote on your panel of judges tells you that your own argument is self-defeating and factually wrong, well, you’ve had better moments than that as an advocate. To be fair, Bursch’s point (at least at oral argument) was that the existence of marriage would encourage heterosexual fathers and mothers who unintentionally conceive to jointly raise and emotionally bond with their children, not that homosexual parents were incapable of forming emotional bonds. So Justice Kennedy’s statement about Mr. Bursch’s argument was incorrect — nevertheless, a bad moment indeed for Bursch because even best-interpreted, it meant his actual argument had been misunderstood by the person most important for him to persuade. He tried to pull his argument out of the fire in response to his next question (which came from Justice Kagan) by directing his attention as soon as he could back to Justice Kennedy:

MR. BURSCH: Because if you’re changing the meaning of marriage from one where it’s based on that biological bond to one where it’s based on emotional commitment, then adults could think, rightly, that this relationship is more about adults and not about the kids. Not the case with the Plaintiffs in this case. We all agree that they are bonded to their kids and have their best interest at heart. But when we’re talking about, Justice Kennedy, over decades, when laws change, when societal views on marriage change, there are consequences to that. And ­­ and what this comes down to is whether you ­­ not whether you agree or disagree with me or a reasonable voter on whether that could happen. It’s whether, in drawing these policy lines ­­ you know, every marriage definition excludes and includes some people. You know, the possible harm is when you change that definition, is that something — 66:7-24

Translated: “No, no, no, Justice Kennedy, the Argument from Dignity doesn’t apply; the plaintiffs have all sorts of dignity. Argument by Definition! Argument from Democracy!” Not the sort of defense he wanted to be playing at that point (and he immediately had to field hits from Justice Breyer).

Seemingly sensing that his best appeal to Kennedy was going to be Argument by Definition, Mr. Bursch referred back to Justice Kennedy’s invocation of it in response to a question from Justice Ginsburg, who made at least her third reference to coverture and the historical status of marriage as legally subordinating women to men in criticism of the historically-flavored Argument by Definition (see 69:25-72:5). Which prompted this lengthy exchange with Justice Kennedy worth reporting in full, because it seems to me fated to be the point that will sway Justice Kennedy’s vote one way or the other — Mr. Bursch’s response to the Argument from Dignity, the argument that underlies the totality of Justice Kennedy’s prior jurisprudence in favor of the rights of LGBTQ Americans:

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just in ­­– just in fairness to you, I don’t understand this not dignity bestowing. I thought that was the whole purpose of marriage. It bestows dignity on both man and woman in a traditional marriage.

MR. BURSCH: It’s supposed to ­­–

JUSTICE KENNEDY: It’s dignity bestowing, and these parties say they want to have that ­­– that same ennoblement.


JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or am I missing your point?

MR. BURSCH: I think you’re missing my point. If we go back to that world where marriage doesn’t exist and the State is trying to figure out how do we link together these kids with their biological moms and dads when possible, the ­­ the glue are benefits and burdens, but not necessarily dignity. You know, dignity may have grown up around marriage as a cultural thing, but the State has no interest in bestowing or taking away dignity from anyone, and certainly it’s not the State’s intent to take dignity away from same­-sex couples or ­­– or from anyone based on their sexual orientation.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I think many States would be surprised, with reference to traditional marriages, they are not enhancing the dignity of both the parties. I’m puzzled by that. But you have another point to make.

MR. BURSCH: Well, the ­­– the main point there is ­­– is the States don’t intend to bestow dignity, but if you turn it into a dignity bestowing institution, then other family structures and children who are excluded from their definition would suffer a dignitary harm. You know, so you can’t draw the line there. And ­­– and when you’re talking about balancing harms and the importance of letting people decide the most fundamental of questions, how do we define marriage in our society, it has other, you know, important things to think about as well. You know, one of those is that when people have to act through the democratic process, it forces neighbors to sit down and civilly discuss an issue and try to persuade each other through reason, love and logic. And we have already seen that happen in eleven States, and if you read some accounts, that could happen in many more very quickly. When you enact social change of this magnitude through the Federal courts, it’s cutting off that dialogue and it’s saying one group gets their definition and the other is maligned as being irrational or filled with animus. And that’s not the way that our democratic process is supposed to work and there are long­-term harms to our country and to that fundamental liberty interest to govern ourselves. All the things that this Court talked about in ­­– in the Schuette decision, if you take away that dynamic, if it’s a court­-imposed definition as opposed to one enacted by the people through the democratic process. 72:6-74:14.

Bursch really redeems himself at the end of this. I get the impression he had Schuette in his back pocket, waiting. Bam! The opportunity presents itself, after a whole lot of troublesome (for him) questions and concerns about the Argument from Dignity. By invoking Schuette, Bursch gets to demand dignity for democracy!  Recall that Schuette was a very recent case about affirmative action, at the University of Michigan, and the plurality opinion was written by Kennedy. Kennedy’s opinion was very deferential to the state’s democratic process; the legislation enacted by citizen referendum prohibiting the University of Michigan from considering race in admissions standards was upheld as not violating the Equal Protections Clause. And it was indeed full of all sorts of wonderful language about citizens debating the issue and finding consensus amongst themselves.

By picking the Argument from Democracy grounded in a recent case decided by Justice Kennedy himself, Bursch ended his time on what is probably the strongest possible note for his side of the case. Finishing strong is a very important part of good oral advocacy, and Mr. Bursch did that. Disagree with his point though I might, it’s hard not to admire the skill and power of that last argument.

Ms. Bonauto reserved three minutes for her rebuttal and no one asked her any questions during it.



The ancient Romans had two concepts defining the prestige of a statesman: dignitas and auctoritas. Dignitas referred to the respect that a public man commanded from the people. It was his charisma, his charm, the esteem in which he was held by others, his ability to demonstrate that he was morally good and in his appropriate place in society. It was signaled by the applause of a crowd and the salutes of peers. Auctoritas referred to the social prestige afforded a man by virtue of the extent of his official powers: his ability to vote, his membership in a governing body such as the Senate, his holding of an official office and discharge of the duties of that office. It was symbolized by the man’s entourage of official bodyguards, carrying ceremonial axes as symbols of the powers vested in him.


At this point, there’s nothing more to read, other than these.

Is the dignitas of an individual seeking to live out a private decision with a loved one more or less important than the auctoritas of a legislator, or perhaps even a voter, to democratically govern as he sees fit? The whole point of having a Constitution is to put certain things out of bounds from the results of democracy. I know that Justice Kennedy is aware of this; I’ve heard him remark as much in speeches I’ve attended. So I’m guardedly hopeful for the prospects of same-sex marriage.

Guardedly. As in, about 60% confidence.

Beginning, as I did, expressing admiration for Jeffrey Rosen’s identification of dignity-as-liberty as an emerging legal concept, and noting that Anthony Kennedy has been a leading propulsive force for that legal movement, it seems most probable that this concept is the one that will remain dominant in Justice Kennedy’s mind.

So if I’m right, and Kennedy votes with the traditionally liberal bloc in favor of a Federal Constitutional right to same-sex marriage, then the second question before the Court will be moot. If every state must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples then the next question, of whether a state that does not issue its own same-sex licenses must recognize the marriages of a state that does, won’t exist.

But I might be wrong. Kennedy has seemed to grow more prudent and more deferential to state governments as his career has advanced. Kennedy’s questions, particularly to Ms. Bonauto, suggest a degree of rigidity in his thinking about what marriage is, what it means, such that he might not be able to make himself overcome his Catholic roots and the position of his faith and upbringing and fundamental social conservatism. He might look back on the Lawrence and Windsor cases and say, “This far and no farther.”

I don’t think so, and it’s not where I’d put my money. Kennedy asked harder questions, with greater vigor, of Mr. Bursch, who seemed to struggle with Kennedy’s questions a little bit more than did Ms. Bonauto or General Verrilli. The reinforcement of the Government’s pro-SSM position from General Verrilli seemed to somewhat mentally soothe him, too. If the Government is in favor of this idea, then there is clearly some official and democratic sanction for it. If he votes in favor of SSM in these cases, he will cement his legacy as a champion of advancing individual rights while still preserving his record as a generally conservative voice on the Court, and that seems to be very clearly the legacy he wishes to carve out for himself.

And, damnit, my gut tells me that he already knows it’s just plain the right thing to do. All his past votes and opinions on gay rights issues tell me that. He’s looking for a reason to do it. Let’s hope that somewhere in these arguments, he finds that reason.

Now, I must return to my regularly-scheduled professional life. Hopefully, a colleague here can brief up the second question soon and our community will have a complete picture of the issues at bar in what may turn out to be the most-watched Supreme Court case of at least a decade, a case obviously destined, whether for good or for ill, to become one of the Great Cases.


[1] This was laconically described by the court reporter with the single-word entry “(Interruption.)” at 27:20 in the transcript. If you’re interested in the audio, again our friends at SCOTUSblog have done nice thing for us all: Tejinder Singh has snipped out about thirty-six minutes of questions and answers, including the protestor’s outburst.

[2] Non-hyperlinked citations are to the transcript from the Question One arguments to the Court, adhering to the convention of “page number, colon, line number” to identify the start and finish points of the quote. Hyperlink additions within block quotes are my own. Question One was whether the Constitution requires states to issue same-sex marriage licenses. Question Two was whether the Constitution requires all States to recognize same-sex marriage licenses issued by other States.

[3] It’s not clear exactly which question General Verrilli is referring to. At 36:4-8, Chief Justice Roberts points out that Ms. Bonauto conceded that the First Amendment rights of a member of the clergy to not officiate a same-sex wedding would trump the rights of a couple to have a wedding in the first place, and then there is some colloquy between Roberts and Verrilli about the Argument from Legal Uniformity, followed by Roberts asking at 37:4-6, “What about Federal — it’s a Federal question if we make it a matter of constitutional law,” again asking why the Government is hesitant to adopt the Argument from Legal Uniformity.


All visual media sourced from Wikimedia Commons; hands-with-rainbow rings, portrait of Ms. Bonauto, and portrait of Mr. Bursch sourced from creative commons licensed photography; cover page photograph from public domain, balance from official U.S. government photographs.

Burt LikkoBurt Likko is the pseudonym of an attorney in Southern California and the managing editor of Ordinary Times. His interests include Constitutional law with a special interest in law relating to the concept of separation of church and state, cooking, good wine, and bad science fiction movies. Follow his sporadic Tweets at @burtlikko, and his Flipboard at Burt Likko.

Please do be so kind as to share this post.

70 thoughts on “Dignitas Versus Auctoritas

  1. Burt, your decision to break the arguments down is extremely clear and helpful. Very impressively done, and your contention that sometimes one argument can be an answer for another, and sometimes it misses the point is dead on. Really impressive and helpful post.

    Philosophy uses the concept of dignity, too, and it can be very fuzzy. Often, dignity question-beggingly refers to things that the arguer would like to possess. Sometimes it’s a preserved autonomy. But it’s also used for the non-autonomous, such as children. Sometimes it can mean being non-disabled – either in terms of preserved autonomy or freedom from pain, as in Death with Dignity movement. Sometimes it’s a catchword for privacy.

    What was interesting about Kennedy’s arguments, I think, is the idea that the state does not just *preserve* dignity, but is invested with *bestowing* dignity. That seems (and I say this as a progressive, albeit far from a diehard one) far too activist a notion of government.

    I thought the Michigan lawyer relied far too heavily on procreation, which is really the weakest of anti-SSM arguments for the blatantly obvious reasons that 1) straight infertile couples have been marrying for at least centuries if not millennia, and 2) gay people have kids. Also, his point that marriage is not historically seen as an emotional commitment is factually false. I’m watching Wolf Hall right now – witness how important it was to Henry VIII to marry someone with whom he had an emotional connection. It trumped all political considerations. You see it in the Bible, where there are frequent references to emotional connections between spouses. You see it in poetry and novels dating back centuries – spouses who love each other, spouses who fail to love one another, spouses who grieve deeply when their partner dies.

      Quote  Link


  2. Burt,
    Here’s what I’m curious about regarding marriage in general, given my POV. How is it that marriage, in whatever form, came to be a product of the State? I mean, it’s a marriage license….a permit to marry. Who thought it was a good idea for that?

      Quote  Link


    • Aren’t there specific property laws that were enshrined in tradition that the state has an interest in protecting? Also certain rights, such as medical decision-making?

        Quote  Link


    • Frankly Damon marriage was a tribal/family group/proto state and finally state institution before it was a religious one. It was how political and economic alliances between groups of people were nailed down. It’s probably older than politics. Marriage was political and state related before there were even states.
      In the west, IIRC, the Catholics only moved into the marriage business big time as the Western Roman Empire crumbled away.

        Quote  Link


      • Separating religion and state also required the government to get into a lot of clerical activities previously done by churches like registering births, marriages, and deaths. Civil marriage was an important part of the struggle against the Catholic Church in 19th century Europe.

          Quote  Link


      • marriage was a tribal/family group/proto state and finally state institution before it was a religious one

        It seems to me that we can find examples of it being a religious one before it was a state institution… to the extent that religion is tied in with tribal/family, it’s part and parcel with that.

        Religion is the ur-State.

          Quote  Link


    • I suspect the answer to your question is “the Puritans,” and before them, “Henry VIII.” The puritans intentionally blurred the line between ecclesiastical and civil authority, and Hank 8 needed to control who could and could not be married personally rather than relying on the Pope for help.

        Quote  Link


    • Others likely no more about the specific genealogy of our current marriage laws, but I’m not sure that you are looking at this the right way. It’s not so much that the state grants you permission to marry as much as it agrees to give your marriage a particular legal status.

      There’s nothing stopping any two people from finding a willing officiant, religious or otherwise, and getting married without a permit. It’s just that the law won’t recognize you and your partner as a married couple, at least unless some common law provisions kick in.

        Quote  Link


      • One thing I’ve noted for years — one could always get same-sex marriage, going back decades. Some churches have been doing it far longer than the law allows.

        Yet the law wouldn’t recognize these marriages.

        And every time I saw the argument about government meddling in religion when it came to same sex marriage, I thought it odd that “What about the religions that DO marry same sex couples? Is ignoring the validity of those marriages not equally as meddlesome?”

          Quote  Link


      • Yeah, my argument against the Christians opposed to gay marriage was always “it won’t matter if you say that people aren’t *REALLY* married before you prevent them from visiting each other in the hospital, or leaving property to each other, or forbidding the joint ownership of property. At the end of the day, you’ll be preventing people from visiting each other in the hospital, leaving property to each other, and forbidding the joint ownership of property. This will eventually start to be really, really depressing for you.”

        At the end of the day, Obergefell is about someone refusing to put a guy’s name on another guy’s death certificate on the “surviving spouse” line.

          Quote  Link


    • Damon, while I agree with the other responses that have been offered, I suspect you’re really asking a more fundamental question. “Why does ANY authority need to be involved in a contract between consenting adults?”

      And the answer I would give is that marriage isn’t fundamentally a contract. Sure, it has that dimension of the two parties agreeing to enter into the relationship but that agreement, the engagement, is not at all enforceable as a contract would be. The part that has teeth and actually means anything is the recognition by the community or larger society that such a relationship exists. In that regard the marriage certificate is akin to a birth or adoption certificate that recognizes a parent/child relationship or even a property title that publicly recognizes an ownership/object relationship. In all these cases the certification of the relationship relies on the recognized authority of a certifying official, be it civil or ecclesiastical.

      The interesting thing to note here may be that in thirty years of marriage I’ve only twice been required to produce our marriage certificate. And in both cases, my current job and when I joined the Navy, the purpose was to ensure that the dependents I was claiming for purposes of benefits were legitimate. Everyone else just pretty much takes you at your word. Unless and until a counter-claim or challenge is offered. Then it serves as proof positive, which can be pretty important when the distinction is between “unrelated strangers” and “closest legal kin.”

        Quote  Link


  3. I’m just digging in here, and while I’m sure the came to it at the same, time, I think the first post published noting ‘Diginity’ (at least that I encountered,) was from Dahlia Lithwick’s Slate piece; published a full day before Rosin.

    Not so much to say Rosin’s isn’t ‘original analysis,’ but to point out that multiple court watches are saying similar things, though Lithwick brings it up as a matter important to Kennedy and not, necessarily the new something protected (which Rosin was very concerned about).

      Quote  Link


    • You know, that may be right but I’ve been so harried mentally by other things that I’ve not read Lithwick so I just wouldn’t know. I love Lithwick’s SCOTUS coverage, and I think she brings a fresh, clever, and dare I say it, fun perspective. Just haven’t got to her yet — in part because I wanted as much of my own analysis as I could muster rather than doing a secondhand digest.

        Quote  Link


      • When I was writing professionally, I struggled with fresh voice vs. informed voice stances a lot. Mostly, I though Rosin’s pieces seemed a response to Lithwick (Remember when I asked for a post? These two pieces are the reason.)

        So what I’m really interested in is Dignity. Like Privacy, this would be something new. When you have time:
        – are there other penumbra rights? Things not expressly said, but that help define the relationship of citizens to the state?

        – Can you, or anyone else, think of other examples, outside of marriage, where dignity might be used in ways that many seem to fear? I guess in how we’re policed, Freddie Gray’s treatment lacked dignity; but I don’t see that as something that will happen soon.

        Finally, this is brilliant:

        Now, you may have already decided that I’m a horrible person for reducing the debate about one of the most critical and prominent civil liberties issues of our lifetimes into a series of six essentially standardized arguments and the Supreme Court’s argument as though the arguments were being deployed against one another like so many Pokémon cards. If so, bear in mind that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy and General Verrilli all tacitly do the same thing here, attaching labels to the arguments to talk about them.

        I often think of SC cases as actual arguments made in briefs and filings, education for the public about those actual arguments made in the court room. It’s to some degree, theater; designed to help ignorant schlubs like me understand the rulings the court makes; the court’s PR machine, so to speak; which requires translators in the for of writers like you, and thinking of the various arguments as objects (as in object oriented programming) or perhaps as different types of LEGO, is a good way to break it down.

          Quote  Link


    • (Sorry, didn’t mean to get my Citizens United in your Obergefell)

      More seriously, I’m not sure that the types of homosexual relationships that they had in ancient Greece really provide the best examples of what SSM advocates wanted to be explored in the discussion of marriage.

      Anyway, I don’t know the extent to which social science ought to have an impact on rights.

      The argument about siblings getting marriage protections is one that Colorado tried to address with Civil Unions a few years back. They tried to offer a relationship that any two people (any two unmarried people, I mean) could enter into and get marriage protections. I mean, “Civil Union protections”. Focus on the Family supported it. I don’t think that siblings getting marriage protections is the dealbreaker the court seems to think it is.

      When they talked about the Nguyen case, I don’t know what they were talking about… and it’s an INS case? Kudos for the clerks who dug that one up and tried to shoehorn it in.

      I really liked Kagan’s arguments. I wish that more judges showed anything near that much deference to stuff like “we don’t live in a pure democracy; we live in a constitutional democracy. And the constitutional the Constitution imposes limits on what people can do and this is one of those cases we see them every day where we have to decide what those limits are or whether the Constitution speaks to something and prevents the democratic processes from operating purely independently” as she does here. Including her.

      The main thing I was looking for was incredulity that marriage isn’t mentioned in the Constitution which would have allowed me to rant about the 9th Amendment for a while.

      As it is, we’re stuck talking about the 10th. And that’s a lot more dicey, here.

        Quote  Link


        • You know, I wish that they would argue that marriage is in a state of crisis and that’s a reason to push for stuff like Same-Sex Marriage rather than oppose it.

          How much easier would it be to lean on the whole “WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN???” argument?

          Arguing against single motherhood, arguing against cohabitation, arguing against divorce becomes a lot easier if you support SSM.

          Hey Christians: you can say “You’re living in sin!” to the faces of homosexual couples and it’ll be approved by society! Just think about it.

            Quote  Link


          • This is my thinking. I didn’t understand the argument that SSM would lead to more opposite-sex couples getting divorced. I can think of two potential rationales for that position:
            1.) Straight folks are going to divorce to go gay marry someone.
            2.) SSM will harm the ‘institution’ of marriage such that straight folks will see divorce as not such a big deal.

            I mean, I can see people making those arguments. I’d be shocked if any actual evidence exists to support them.

              Quote  Link


            • The argument that makes sense to me is one of “if you make marriage about two people who love each other rather than about two people who want to start a family, you’re going to end up with a lot more couples that believe that marriage is about feelings (which end) than about families (which you’re stuck with)” but that changed long before homosexuality was removed from the DSM.

                Quote  Link


              • True.

                And that doesn’t necessarily mean fewer happily married couples.

                If 100 people marry and 10 get divorced, you have a ‘success rate’ of 90% and 90 married couples.
                If 200 people marry because marriage is now a broader institution and 30 get divorced, you have a ‘success rate’ of just 85% but you now have 170 married couples.

                It seems this argument is predicated on the ‘success rate’ instead of the total number of married couples. A greater frequency of divorce does not necessarily mean fewer successful marriages.

                  Quote  Link


  4. I think I love the fashion vignette most of all.

    4. The Argument from Harmlessness: Same-sex marriage is a private decision between consenting adults, which causes no harm to anyone else and which implicates no substantial legitimate governmental interest. Therefore, it should be permitted.

    What I don’t get about this is that the US government has long expressed an interest in marriage. A month or so ago, everybody sent to the IRS information whether they were married or single which in turn influenced the taxes still due (or money owed back).

    I think this very much undercuts the anti-ssm case in that this is obvious case where marriage is important, but kids not necessarily so, but it does show that there a “substantial legitimate government interest” does it not?

      Quote  Link


    • +1 on both points,

      If, for some horrific reason, I’m hospitalized today and my husband presents himself as my medical-decision maker, nobody will question that he’s my husband; we’ll not be asked for a marriage certificate at the hospital. But until my state approved SSM, that’s exactly the trouble my brother and his partner had — they were required to produce the legal contracts they’d made giving each other that decision-making power.

        Quote  Link


  5. Mr. Rosen even goes so far as to point out that describing dignity as a dimension of liberty may well wind up having a dark side that might later be regretted by liberals, progressives, and others who would applaud a finding in June of a Constitutional right to same-sex marriage.

    I read Rosen’s article and I found this dimension of his argument flabbergasting. Maybe I am an misunderstanding it, but it appears to come down to something on the order of let’s be careful about celebrating the court’s respect for dignity in cases involving things we like, like same sex marriage, because that same respect for dignity could let people do lots of things that we don’t like.

    Has contemporary progressivism really moved that far away from its roots in political liberalism? This idea of mutually respecting human dignity is one of the first principles of political liberalism. I’m going to respect your right to do all sorts of things that I don’t necessarily agree with, because I want you to respect my right to do all sorts of things that you don’t agree with.

      Quote  Link


    • jr,
      I worry about what “dignity” is going to mean. It sounds squishy to me.
      Now, if we’re construing “government shall not take away dignity” — that falls in the same lines as “right to privacy”, and I can fully support that.

      But having dignity as a positive right? I’m not certain about that. The “right to pursue happiness” is going to cause us ENOUGH fits (actually, that’s probably not considered a legal right… at least I hope not).

      Consent, to take a different subject, may be squishy — but that’s mostly because we accept that having sex isn’t “pulling out a kidney” and thus we can allow slightly less informed consent without considering it illegal.

        Quote  Link


    • Speaking personally his examples did not move me much. IIRC he brought up gun controls being struck down and the rights of business owners to refuse service for wedding services. Frankly I’m not worried about either of those at all.

        Quote  Link


  6. I suspect if SCOTUS goes for SSM, Roberts is gonna try really hard (and Kennedy will probably come along) to reduce it to sex discrimination.

    That, effectively, plows no new ground. Sexual orientation doesn’t get a boost towards becoming a more protected class, no new doctrines are created, no new tests. Just an application of an already existing precedent.

    I did find the constant refrains of ‘millennia of marriage traditions’ annoying. That could only be said by very Western-centric folks who didn’t even have a passing familiarity with history.

      Quote  Link


    • Yeah, one thing I wondered about the Argument By Definition/History is why no one said “Nuh-uh.” I mean, the very book that most anti-SSM people point to in their Argument from Conscience both describes and condones polygamy (in some cases, demands it).

      Also, for pete’s sake, polygamy is currently legal in many countries.

      So clearly marriage doesn’t have to be, and hasn’t always been, limited to one man and one woman. I guess you might argue that it has usually included at least one man and one woman, but most anti-SSM peeps aren’t okay with plural marriage either (as evidenced by the Argument by Slippery Slope).

      Clearly, societies have changed the definition of marriage before, and the world kept on spinnin’, somehow.

        Quote  Link


        • 1) The argument was simply “marriage has always been between one man and one woman”. Clearly, that ain’t even remotely true.

          2) A majority of people in this country (and the overlap with anti-SSM peeps is very broad) have no problem appearing on the same list with most of those same countries when you talk about stuff like the death penalty. Post-hoc, ad-hoc, take your pick.

          3) On the other hand, the “crapsack countries” defense sorta implies that moving from polygamy to monogamy was progress (only in the good sense of the word, natch), which itself implies both that marriage can progress, and that it should continue progressing. (Also, it’s a difficult sell, to put it mildly, that gay marriage is the beginning of the road to Sharia law.)

          4) You’ve still got to explain why it was totes cool that Solomon had all those wives (and women who weren’t even wives), but nowadays to allow such a thing would be TEOTWAWKI.

          I would have no problem re-defining marriage even if we’d never done it before, and any concerns I had would fall under the Argument from Prudence. I suspect you think similarly and are playing devil’s advocate, which I appreciate. I’m still left wondering why no one dispatched this argument simply by pointing out that it was untrue.

            Quote  Link


    • I did find the constant refrains of ‘millennia of marriage traditions’ annoying. That could only be said by very Western-centric folks who didn’t even have a passing familiarity with history.

      Understanding history is just an incredible nuisance when you’re just trying to use history to backwards rationalize your current prejudices.

        Quote  Link


      • Soyatameyer was, at least, pushing back. Modern marriage, in America, is either a century old or about 30-40 years old, depending.

        Go back more than a century, and marriage is effectively a transfer of property (the woman) between two men.

        Go back more than 30, and you’re past no-fault divorce and interracial marriage, both of which were significant components of ‘modern marriage’. A marriage is something EITHER party can exit, and is between any loving couple of age (as long as they’re not the same sex). Both of which were fairly significant changes.

        Pretty sure some of the amicus briefs cover all that, though.

          Quote  Link


  7. The Argument from Conscience bothers me a great deal, since it’s a perfect argument against all forms of religious toleration, including, say, allowing mosques (or even synagogues) to be built. Just make one simple substitution:

    A person might wish to condemn recognition of false religions as morally wrong, as when they feel compelled to do so by way of religious creed. Writing recognition of false religions into the law compels such people to afford dignity and recognition to something they personally believe to be morally wrong, legally overriding their own consciences.

      Quote  Link


    • I’m mostly with you on this, . This is particularly true when we are discussing not just this argument in this context, even moreso its close legal cousin, the way that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is being used in contemporary jurisprudence.

      When this argument is used with sincerity and in good faith, I think there is some meat on those bones that requires a candid response: “Yes, you may indeed have to acknowledge and tolerate something that you would prefer did not exist. Your approval is not what is demanded, only your tolerance. This is the price of living in a pluralistic society.”

        Quote  Link


  8. Bursch looks like he is about 17 years old.
    I find it interesting that you called his firm prestigious because there was an article in the NY Times about how the really big and
    Prestigious firms don’t want to be anywhere near the anti-Ssm crowd

      Quote  Link


  9. The question that is begged in all sides of this argument is “The person who is (nominally) the primary contactee of my genitals should also be the primary recipient of any benefits that accrue to me and the spokesperson for me upon my incapacity.”

    Apparently I am the only one who finds this ludicrous.

    Although I know the actual answer is “existence bias.”

      Quote  Link


  10. This was a wonderful, informative read, Burt. Thank you so much!

    I’m actually a little baffled by the apparent power of the Argument from Dignity perspective with Justice Kennedy. I’m not sure why it’s particularly persuasive legally compared to the Argument from Equality, the Argument from Fundamental Rights, or the Argument from Legal Uniformity, which all seem much more grounded in the Constitution and legal tradition to this non-attorney.

    I also have to say I’m not sure that I want or expect the state to bestow or recognize my dignity in terms of my relationship with my husband. It’s been a (mostly unspoken) point of pride for me that we had been together for over a quarter of a century before society bestowed any recognition, let alone approval, on our pairing. I don’t need dignity bestowed, we have been successful despite homophobia and heterosexism from every corner. I want my damned equality! I want to be assured of hospital visitation, decision-making, uncomplicated inheritance, some modicum of financial security that comes from sharing lives, and so on and so forth.

    At the same time, I’m not sure why the fact that I’ve been in a successful relationship makes my husband and me somehow more admirable than my friends who are single. While I believe I should have the same rights and privileges as someone who by chance is heterosexual, I recognize that marriage equality is not an especially effective way to make people’s lives better off in general. I was one of those gay folks who would have much rather focused on universal healthcare as a solution to uninsured partners of gay employees. Luckily, we (sort of) ended up with both. Partly.

    If society deigns to define my relationship as worthy because it (eventually, I hope) has legal status in my state of residence, that’s fine. But it’s not the most important thing to me.

      Quote  Link


    • For what it’s worth, , assurances “…of hospital visitation, decision-making, uncomplicated inheritance, some modicum of financial security that comes from sharing lives, and so on and so forth” appear to be precisely what Justice Kennedy has in mind when he contemplates the state as bestowing dignity through use of the word “marriage.” I get it with my opposite-sex spouse; there’s no good reason at all that you shouldn’t get it with your same-sex spouse the same way. (Note: Argument from Equality.)

        Quote  Link


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *